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Abstract
While previous empirical literature has examined the eﬀect of founder-CEOs on firm per-
formance, it has largely ignored the eﬀect of firm performance on founder-CEO status. In
this paper, we use instrumental variables methods to better understand the relationship be-
tween founder-CEOs and performance. Using the proportion of the firm’s founders that are
dead and the number of people who founded the company as instruments for founder-CEO
status, we find strong evidence that founder-CEO status is endogenous in performance re-
gressions. After instrumenting for founder-CEO status, we identify a positive causal eﬀect of
founder-CEOs on firm performance which is quantitatively larger than the eﬀect estimated
through standard OLS regressions. Contrary to the common perception that founder-CEOs
will retain their titles following good performance, we show that performance is negatively
related to the likelihood that founders retain the CEO title. This result appears to be
driven primarily by founder departures after periods of good performance, rather than by
an entrenchment eﬀect that allows founders to remain as CEOs following poor performance.
We provide several potential explanations for this new finding.
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1 Introduction
Founders have unique relationships with their firms. Because of their privileged position,
founders may be able to extract higher private benefits of control. Founder-CEOs might also
distort investment decisions because they are not well-diversified. As firms evolve, founders
may no longer have the necessary expertise to run their companies (Wasserman, 2003), but
they may be unwilling to relinquish control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). When they do give
up control, they may have a preference for passing it on to potentially underqualified family
members (Pérez-González, 2002). On the other hand, their incentives might be more aligned
with outside shareholders than those of professional managers, not only because founders
usually have high ownership stakes, but also because they might have longer investment
horizons (Stein, 1989). Because they care about their firms, they may exert more eﬀort for
a given incentive structure (Palia and Ravid, 2002).
These arguments suggest that the relationship between firm performance and founder-
CEO status is diﬀerent than it is for professional managers. Not only may firm performance
be diﬀerent when the founder is in charge, but performance may also aﬀect founder-CEO
turnover in a diﬀerent manner than it aﬀects the turnover of professional CEOs. Previous
empirical literature has examined the eﬀect of founder-CEOs on firm performance. Man-
agement studies report a positive correlation, a negative eﬀect, or no eﬀect (Jayaraman et
al., 2000). In the finance literature, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConaughy et al
(1998), Palia and Ravid (2002), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Fahlenbrach (2005), and Villa-
longa and Amit (2005) report a positive eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance. However,
these studies largely ignore the eﬀect of firm performance on founder-CEO turnover.1 There
are good reasons to expect the founder-CEO status to be a function of firm performance.
For example, because CEOs appear to retain their titles more frequently when the firm is
doing well (Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990),
this might also be true for founders. On the other hand, if founders are entrenched then it
might be diﬃcult to remove them, even following poor performance. This entrenchment ef-
fect could bias the coeﬃcient on founder-CEO status downward in performance regressions.
In this paper, we attempt to understand the exact nature of the relationship between
1Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2005) use idiosyncratic risk and other variables as
instruments for family ownership and family control in some regressions, but they do not focus specifically
on the founder-CEO variable. In parallel research, Fahlenbrach (2005) develops alternative instruments for
the founder-CEO variable, but he does not focus directly on the eﬀect of performance on founder-CEO
turnover.
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founder-CEOs and performance, by fully incorporating the eﬀect of firm performance on
founder-CEO status into the empirical analysis. We use instrumental variables methods to
disentangle the eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance from the eﬀect of performance on
founder-CEO status. Our methodology allows us to identify whether founder-CEOs have
a positive or negative eﬀect on performance, and whether performance has a positive or
negative eﬀect on founder-CEO status.
Our primary sample consists of data on Fortune 500 firms over the 1992-1999 period.
Using Tobin’s Q and ROA as measures of performance, we confirm the positive correlation
between founder-CEO status and firm performance in OLS regressions that was found in
some of the previous studies cited above. However, we cannot necessarily infer a causal
relationship from this positive correlation. To address the endogeneity problem we need
instruments that are correlated with founder-CEO status but are uncorrelated with perfor-
mance except through variables included in the performance regression.
We use two instruments. The first is the proportion of the firm’s founders that are dead.
The second is the number of people who founded the company. Using these instruments,
we find strong evidence that founder-CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions,
which implies that the eﬀect of founder-CEOs cannot be correctly estimated using OLS.
However, after instrumenting for founder-CEO status, we still find evidence consistent with
a positive causal eﬀect of founder-CEOs on firm performance. This finding corroborates
the suggestion that firms led by their founders perform better than other firms.
Perhaps surprisingly, the two-stage least squares regressions suggest that after factoring
out the direct eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance, the remaining correlation between
performance and the likelihood that the founder retains the CEO title is negative. Thus
better performing firms are less likely to have a founder as the CEO. This novel finding
appears to be inconsistent with the general notion that founder-CEOs will retain their titles
following good performance.
We provide several possible explanations for this finding. For example, one possibility
is that the results are explained by an omitted variable measuring the overall quality of
governance: firms with bad governance are more likely to perform badly and to have a
founder who is entrenched. Another possibility is that founder-CEOs are more likely to
relinquish control following good performance. To shed further light on this issue, we
examine the eﬀect of past extreme performances on the likelihood that founders retain the
CEO title. We find that both good and bad past performance increase the probability
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that founders step down. Thus we conclude that the negative eﬀect of performance on
founder-CEO status appears to be driven primarily by founder departures after periods of
good performance, rather than by an entrenchment eﬀect that allows founders to remain
as CEOs following poor performance. We conjecture that the eﬀect of good performance
on founder-CEO departures might be due either to a “controlled succession” eﬀect (Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), whereby founders who wish to transfer control to their heirs can
accomplish this more easily following good performance, or more simply to the fact that
founders leave their companies only when they are in good shape (Wasserman, 2003).
We start in section 2 by discussing related literature. In section 3 we describe our
sample, which we use in section 4 to examine OLS regressions of performance on founder-
CEO status. In section 5, we address the endogeneity of founder-CEO status. Section
6 provides further evidence on the causal relationship from performance to founder-CEO
status and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
As we already discussed, other papers examine the eﬀect of founder-CEOs on firm perfor-
mance. None of these papers focuses on the eﬀect of performance on founder-CEO turnover.
A diﬀerent approach is taken by Johnson et al. (1985), who analyze the stock price reaction
following the unexpected death of senior corporate executives.2 The authors find that, while
there is little reaction on average to sudden executive deaths, there is a positive stock price
reaction following the sudden death of a corporate founder. Their suggested interpretation
for these results is that corporate founders have higher bargaining power when bargaining
over employment contracts with shareholders, and thus receive a larger share of profits than
do professional managers who succeed the founder.
An additional explanation for the Johnson et al. (1985) findings is suggested by Schwert
(1985) - the “founder eﬀect” may be due to the break up of a large control block of stock,
increasing the likelihood of future corporate control fights (that generally benefit target
shareholders). This idea is also consistent with the results in Slovin and Sushka (1993), who
find that the stock price reaction that follows the death of inside blockholders is higher when
the deceased executive’s equity stake is large. Their result holds irrespective of whether the
executive is a CEO or a founder of the firm. In addition, Zingales (1995) reports evidence
2Notice that because sudden executive deaths are exogenous events, Johnson et al. (1985) cannot examine
the eﬀect of performance on the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title, as we do.
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consistent with the idea that the death of an executive who owns a lot of stock changes the
strategic value of a vote and increases the premium of voting shares. Thus, the positive
stock price reaction found by Johnson et al. (1985) does not preclude the possibility that
firms run by founders perform better than other firms.3
Our results are also related to the growing literature on family firms. Family firms in-
clude those that are controlled by their founders, and also by the founders’ families (Burkart,
Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003). Anderson and Reeb (2003) empirically identify a family firm
as one in which the founding family either continues to have an ownership stake, or has one
of the seats on the board of directors. Their evidence suggests that family firms perform
better than non-family firms, both in terms of accounting (ROA, ROE) and market per-
formance (Tobin’s Q).4 Because firms where the CEO is a founder are by definition family
firms, these results are directly related to our results.
However, not all family firms are directly managed by their founders. In fact, previous
literature also suggests that not all family firms are good performers. Morck, Strangeland,
and Yeung (1998) find a negative correlation between heir control in Canadian firms and
firm performance. Pérez-González (2002) also provides evidence that inherited control by
a family member is bad for performance. In his sample, ROA falls by approximately 20%
following the transfer of control to a family heir, and there is a negative stock price reaction
when control is inherited. These findings raise the possibility that the higher performance
of family firms is driven mostly by firms where the current CEO is a founder, a hypothesis
which is consistent with the results that we report in this paper, and also with some results
in Anderson and Reeb (2003).5
The literature examining the eﬀect of performance on the likelihood that a founder
retains the title of CEO is considerably more sparse. An exception is Wasserman (2003), who
uses a sample of 202 small Internet firms to examine founder-CEO successions. Although
his sample is very diﬀerent from ours, his main findings are consistent with ours. A founder-
CEO’s success in achieving critical milestones such as a successful completion of product
development makes it more likely that a founder will relinquish the CEO title. Thus, it
may be the case that the best performing companies replace the founder-CEO sooner than
3In fact, Fahlenbrach (2005) finds that firms managed by founder-CEOs had positive abnormal stock
returns in the 1990s.
4Consistent with a positive eﬀect of families on performance, Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) find
that family firms face a lower cost of debt than non-family firms.
5See also Villalonga and Amit (2005), who classify family firms into several categories and find that family
ownership creates value only when the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm or as its Chairman.
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the worst performing companies. However, because Wasserman (2003) does not examine
the eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance measures, the interpretation of his results is
potentially compromised by an endogeneity problem (i.e., performance is also a function of
whether the CEO is a founder of the company or not).
3 Data Description
Our primary sample consists of data on publicly traded firms in the 1998 Fortune 500, ex-
cluding regulated financial firms and utilities, during 1992-1999 for which data are available
on ExecuComp (2000). From Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp (2000) we obtain the names
of the sample firms’ CEOs, CEO ownership and tenure as CEO as well as some financial
information.6 We gather the remaining financial information from Compustat and the date
of the firm’s incorporation from Moody’s Industrial Manuals (1999), proxy statements and
annual reports for fiscal 1998. Our final sample consists of 2,128 complete firm-years of
data for 321 firms during the 1992-1999 time period.
Since ExecuComp (2000) does not contain information on whether the CEO is also a
founder, we define founderCEO in a given year to be 0 if the firm was incorporated at least
64 years prior to the current year or if the current CEO joined the company at least 4 years
after the date of the firm’s incorporation.7 For the remaining firm-years we checked whether
the current CEO was one of the firm’s founders in a variety of sources consisting of proxy
statements, annual reports and the internet.8 We set founderCEO in a given year equal to
1 if any source explicitly named the current CEO as a founder or the main executive at the
time the company began (including when it was spun-oﬀ).
6 In ExecuComp the data item containing the proportional ownership of the CEO is often missing if
ownership is less than 5%. We therefore calculate it as the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO
to total shares outstanding after adjusting the number of shares owned by the CEO for stock splits. While
ExecuComp (2000) adjusts the total shares outstanding for stock splits it may not adjust CEO ownership
(as can be seen in the case of CEO Bill Gates of Microsoft whose mean ownership according to ExecuComp
(2000) is 5.5% during 1992-1999, but whose actual mean ownership is 23.6%), however it does include an
adjustment factor (Access item: AJEX) that can be used to adjust ownership. After raising this issue with
Standard and Poor’s, they changed how ExecuComp reports CEO ownership so that it no longer needs to
be adjusted for stock splits in the later versions of the data. However, all data pulled from earlier versions
still need to be adjusted.
7The longest period of time a CEO has been working for his firm in our sample is 59 years. We use
64 years as a cutoﬀ to account for missing data on CEO firm tenure. Since most firms are founded several
years prior to the date of incorporation this procedure ensures that we check more CEOs than are likely to
be founders.
8When we could find the name of the firm’s original founders this procedure was straightforward. However,
very few proxies, annual reports or company websites disclosed the names of the original founders. We were
most successful doing a search with the name of the executive and the word founder using the Google search
engine.
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We use both a market-based measure of performance for our sample firms, Tobin’s Q,
as well as an accounting measure, ROA. We define Tobin’s Q to be the ratio of the firm’s
market value to its book value. The firm’s market value is calculated as the book value of
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. We define ROA to
be the ratio of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to its
book value of assets.
In Table 1 we present summary statistics concerning select financial variables and CEO
characteristics. During our sample period a founder was the CEO at some point for 50 of
our sample firms (15.6% of firms). On the whole a founder was the CEO during 11.1% of
firm-years.
4 The Empirical Correlation between Founder-CEOs and Firm
Performance-Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
As a first step in understanding the relationship between founder-CEO status and firm per-
formance, we check whether the retention of the CEO title by the founder is correlated with
firm performance in our sample. Sections 5 and 6, in which we discuss possible endogeneity
problems and causality issues, analyze this relationship in more depth.
Our measures of firm performance are Tobin’s Q and ROA. We use two benchmark
models for performance throughout this paper. The first one postulates that the variable
founderCEO might aﬀect performance along with other firm-level characteristics, which are
the log of total assets (a proxy for firm size), the log of firm age, a measure of stock return
volatility and 2-digit industry dummies (we omit time and firm subscripts, and y is the
performance variable):
y = b0 + b1founderCEO + b2 ln (assets)+ b3 ln (firm age)+ b4volatility (1)
+industry dummies+ time dummies + u.
We do not use firm fixed-eﬀects in our specification because our main explanatory vari-
able (founderCEO) varies little over time for a given firm.9 To calculate all t-statistics,
9 In the context of the ownership literature, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue for the use of
firm fixed eﬀects in regressions which relate ownership to firm performance. However, Zhou (2001) points out
that if the explanatory variable changes slowly over time (as do ownership and, in our case, founderCEO),
firm fixed-eﬀect regressions may fail to detect relationships in the data even when they exist. In addition,
Fahlenbrach (2005) shows evidence suggesting that the correlation between founder-CEOs and performance
is not caused by a firm fixed eﬀect.
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we use heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. In addition, to account for over-time
correlation within the same firm, we cluster observations by firm.10
In Table 2, we report the results of regression (1) for the two performance measures.
Column I reports the results using logQ as the performance measure,11 and Column III
reports the results using ROA as the performance measure. FounderCEO is significantly
positively correlated with both logQ and ROA at the 1% significance level (the p-values
are 0.001 and 0.004, respectively). Of the other three variables, volatility enters with a
significant negative sign in both regressions, while firm size and age have significant negative
eﬀects only when performance is measured by ROA.
Because it is plausible that founderCEO is correlated with CEO characteristics, it is
possible that our results reflect a spurious correlation between founderCEO and performance
that is due to omitted variables. In our second specification, we therefore include several
CEO characteristics in an attempt to correct for this problem. In particular, we identified
three obvious candidates for which founderCEO might be considered a good proxy variable.
The first is CEO ownership: it is likely that founders hold a disproportionately large fraction
of the firm’s equity. It is also reasonable to expect that founders would have long tenures in
the firm before leaving the CEO position. Finally, the fraction of the CEO’s compensation
which is based on equity may be correlated with founderCEO because of diﬀering pay-for-
performance incentives for founders. Because all three of these variables might also have
direct eﬀects on performance, we add them to our original benchmark model to get:12
y = b0 + b1founderCEO + b2 ln (assets)+ b3 ln (firm age)+ b4volatility (2)
+b5CEO ownership+ b6CEO tenure+ b7CEO equity pay
+industry dummies+ time dummies + u.
In Columns II and IV of Table 2, we report the results of regression (2) for the two perfor-
mance measures. Consistent with omitted variable concerns, we find in both specifications
that the coeﬃcients on founderCEO are smaller than those in the previous specifications.
However, founderCEO is still significantly positively correlated with logQ at the 1% signif-
icance level (the p-value is exactly 0.01) and with ROA at the 10% significance level (the
10Alternative procedures to deal with the group correlation problem lead to virtually identical results.
For example, both averaging all variables over the 1992-1999 period or running year-by-year cross-section
regressions produce estimated eﬀects and standard errors that are very similar to the ones we report.
11We chose a log-linear specification for Q due to the fact that Q can never be negative. Using Q instead
of logQ as the dependent variable might therefore generate fitted values that are outside of the range of Q.
12Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), we use the value of CEOs’ annual option pay divided by the sum
of salary, bonus and option pay to measure a CEO’s equity-based pay.
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p-value is 0.056). CEO ownership is also significantly positively related to performance,
while CEO equity pay is only significant in the logQ regression. CEO tenure does not have
a statistically significant eﬀect on performance.
Taken at face value, what is the economic significance of these results? It is important
to note that because we are using a log-linear specification for Q, the marginal eﬀect of
founder-CEOs on Q varies positively with the level of Q. In our sample, the average Q is
2.05. If we take the estimated coeﬃcient on founderCEO from regression (2) as our estimate
of the eﬀect of founder-CEOs on Q, our results suggest that a firm with an average Q will
experience a drop of 0.37 units in Q whenever its CEO is not also one of its founders. This
eﬀect is not trivial, but also not too large: it is about one fourth of the sample standard
deviation of Q.
Our OLS estimates of the eﬀects of founder-CEOs on the diﬀerent measures of firm per-
formance are also directly comparable to the ones reported by Anderson and Reeb (2003).
Using a diﬀerent sample-selection procedure and diﬀerent empirical models from the ones
we use in this paper, they find that founder-CEOs have a marginal eﬀect on Q of 0.47 units.
While our marginal eﬀect for the average firm in our preferred specification is somewhat
lower (0.37), our log-linear specification is not directly comparable to theirs, because our
estimated marginal eﬀects are not constant. When we re-estimate our preferred model using
Q instead of logQ as the dependent variable, we obtain an estimated marginal eﬀect of 0.52
(t = 2.30; p-value = 0.022), which is not statistically diﬀerent from 0.47 at any reasonable
significance level. Although the log-linear specification appears to produce more conserva-
tive estimates than the linear specification, we continue to use our log-linear specification
for Q because the diﬀerences are small. In addition, our maximum likelihood approach in
the next sections requires that, conditional on the right-hand side variables, the dependent
variable should be normally distributed. This assumption may not be unreasonable for
logQ, but it is false by construction for Q.
The similarities between our results and the ones found in Anderson and Reeb (2003)
also extend to accounting measures of performance. They find that founder-CEOs have a
marginal eﬀect on ROA of 3.14 (when ROA is measured using net income, as in this paper),
an eﬀect that is somewhat larger than the one we report in Column IV of Table 2 (1.75),
but fairly close to the one we report in Column III (2.77). They also use a diﬀerent proxy
for the return on assets based on EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and
amortization) in their regressions. For comparison, we re-estimated our two benchmark
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models using EBITDA instead of net income as the numerator for ROA. Our estimates
for the coeﬃcient on founderCEO are 0.031 (t = 2.35; p-value = 0.01) and 0.026 (t = 1.85;
p-value = 0.064) for the first and second model, respectively, which are quite similar to the
estimate of 0.035 in Anderson and Reeb (2003).13
Overall it appears that the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient on the founder-CEO
dummy in a linear performance regression is not very sensitive to the choice of the set of
control variables. Furthermore, survivorship biases do not appear to be a major concern in
such regressions. Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) procedure of choosing firms in the S&P 500
in 1992 and then following them until 1999 introduces a very diﬀerent type of selection bias
than our approach of choosing the firms in the Fortune 500 in 1998 and following them back
in time. Nevertheless, the fact that our estimates are virtually identical to theirs is a signal
that these diﬀerent types of survivorship biases are not creating a discrepancy between
the two sets of findings. Thus the positive relationship between the retention of the CEO
title by one of the founders and both market and accounting measures of firm performance
appears to be fairly robust. The important question, to which we turn next, is how should
one interpret this relationship? Should one conclude that the retention of the CEO title
by one of the company’s founders leads to superior performance? Or is it the other way
around, that is, is superior performance a reason for a founder to remain as CEO? Or is
it both? To gain further insight into the nature of the relationship between founder-CEOs
and firm performance, we will try to disentangle these diﬀerent eﬀects in the remainder of
the paper.
5 Assessing the Causal Relationships between Founder-CEOs
and Firm Performance
5.1 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
In this section we use two-stage least squares methods to try to isolate the eﬀects of founder-
CEOs on performance from other sources of variation. We first discuss the validity of the
two diﬀerent variables that we use as instruments for founderCEO, which are dead founders
and the number of founders, and then we describe the results of our 2SLS regressions.
Details on the construction of the instruments and their summary statistics are provided in
13Although our results are similar when we use EBITDA instead of net income to construct ROA, it is
easier to detect evidence consistent with the existence of an endogeneity problem using EBITDA. Thus we
choose to use net income instead of EBITDA to be more conservative.
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the Appendix.
• Dead Founders
The first variable we use as an instrument is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the founder died before the start of our sample period and zero otherwise (if there
are multiple founders, we take the average of this variable among all founders). The mo-
tivation for this instrument is simple: dead founders cannot be CEOs. However, to be a
good instrument dead founders must also be uncorrelated with performance except through
explanatory variables contained in the second stage regression. We find it unlikely that
founders’ deaths are caused by performance. The death of a founder should be a fairly
exogenous event which will aﬀect the likelihood that the current CEO is one of the founders
but that does not have a plausible direct eﬀect on performance, except when the founder
happens to be the CEO.
• Number of Founders
The second variable we use as an instrument is the number of founders of each firm. We
believe that this variable also satisfies the conditions necessary for a valid instrument. First,
the probability that the current CEO is one of the founders is mechanically increasing in the
number of founders, although since one founder often plays a more dominant role than the
others we expect this correlation to be weaker than in the case of our other instrument.14
Second, it should be fairly exogenous in our setup. In particular, the number of founders is
unlikely to have any direct eﬀect on firm performance years after the founding event.
Table 3 reports the outcomes of the first-stage regressions of founderCEO on our two
instruments and the other controls from the models (1) and (2). From Table 3 we see
that both proposed instruments are strongly correlated with founderCEO : consistent with
intuition dead founders enters the regressions negatively with t-statistics of −17.16 and
14The case of Arrow Electronics illustrates how the number of founders may influence whether or not the
current CEO is a founder (see Hoovers 2002, Fortune, January 12, 1981, p. 19 and The New York Times,
December 6, 1980, p. 26). In 1968 three friends led a group of investors in acquiring a then obscure company
called Arrow Electronics Corporation. After merging it with another company, they used it to found what
is now one of the largest distributors of electronic components in the country. One of the partners, Duke
Glenn, Jr., was the Chairman and CEO. The other two were Executive Vice-Presidents. In 1980 a hotel
fire killed 13 members of Arrow’s senior management including the founder/CEO and another founder. The
remaining founder, John Waddell, was immediately named acting CEO and remained CEO with only brief
interruptions until 1986. Although Waddell’s primary responsibilities were in corporate administration and
communications before the fire, the crisis led the board to choose him as acting CEO because he was one of
the original founders.
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−11.94 in columns I and II, respectively, while the number of founders enters them positively
with t-statistics of 4.10 and 4.66 in columns I and II, respectively.
In Table 4, we report the results of the second-stage regression using model (1) for the
two performance measures. From Columns I and II we see that founderCEO is significantly
positively related to logQ at the 1% significance level (the p-values are always lower than
0.001). Similarly, in Columns III and IV we see that founderCEO is significantly positively
correlated with ROA at the 1% significance level (the p-values are always lower than 0.004).
These results suggest a causal positive eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance. Under the
assumption that our instruments are valid, our results suggest that firms with founders as
their CEOs appear to perform better than others on average.
Perhaps surprisingly, the 2SLS results are not consistent with the idea that good per-
formance is a reason for a founder to remain as CEO, since all estimated coeﬃcients on
founderCEO are larger when we use 2SLS instead of OLS. Furthermore, the diﬀerences
between the 2SLS and the OLS results are statistically significant. At the bottom of Table
4, we report the diﬀerences between the 2SLS and OLS estimates of the eﬀect of founder-
CEOs on performance, along with their t-statistics, which are computed using the method
in Hausman’s (1978) specification tests. We find that all diﬀerences are statistically diﬀer-
ent from zero at the 1% significance level. Thus, under the maintained assumption that the
instruments are valid, this finding is consistent with the idea that good performance might
actually reduce the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title, which explains why the
OLS eﬀects are smaller than the 2SLS eﬀects.
Under the maintained assumption that our instruments are valid, we cannot reject that
there is significant endogeneity in the one-equation procedures that try to estimate the
eﬀect of founder-CEOs on market and accounting measures of performance. Thus, OLS
procedures that ignore the endogeneity of founder-CEO status in performance regressions,
such as the ones in the previous section, can be potentially misleading because they generate
inconsistent estimates of the economically relevant parameter of interest. In addition, the
larger values of our 2SLS estimates suggest that once one factors out the direct eﬀect of
founder-CEOs on performance that is induced by our instruments, the remaining correlation
between firm performance and the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title is negative.
This result is not consistent with the intuition advanced in several recent studies examining
the eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2005),
that good performance should lead founder-CEOs to retain their titles.
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If we take the estimated coeﬃcient on founderCEO from the 2SLS regression of model
(2) as our estimate of the eﬀect of founder-CEOs on Q, our results imply that a firm with
average Q will experience a drop of 3 units in its Q if its CEO is not also one of its founders.
This eﬀect is almost 10 times larger than the one estimated by OLS. While a negative causal
relationship from performance to founder-CEOs would imply that the OLS estimates of the
eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance are biased downward, it seems unlikely that the true
eﬀect should be so large. In the next section, we therefore investigate whether the extent
of the diﬀerence between the OLS and 2SLS results is a result of model misspecification.
5.2 Endogenous Dummy Variable Model
A puzzling result from the previous subsection is the size of the estimated marginal eﬀect
of founder-CEOs on performance. It is thus natural to ask whether these values are robust
to diﬀerent econometric procedures: Is there something specific to the 2SLS procedure we
are using that is producing excessively large estimates? Or is the eﬀect of founder-CEOs
on performance really that big?
One noticeable feature of our 2SLS procedure is that, although founderCEO is binary,
in the first-stage regression we ignore the discrete nature of this variable. Two-stage least
squares consistency of the second stage does not hinge on getting the functional form right
in the first stage, so one does not necessarily have to use a discrete dependent variable
model for a dummy endogenous variable (see Angrist and Krueger, 2001). However, 2SLS
leads to biased estimates in finite samples and it is not known how misspecification in the
first stage may aﬀect this bias. Therefore, in this section we jointly estimate a system of
equations in which we explicitly account for the binary nature of founderCEO.
We formulate the following model:
y = b0 + b1founderCEO +Xβ + u1 (3)
I = Zα+ u2 (4)
founderCEO =
½
1 if I ≥ I∗
0 if I < I∗
(5)
where u1 v N
¡
0,σ2
¢
, u2 v N (0, 1) and corr (u1, u2) = ρ. Equation (3) is the same one
we have estimated by single-equation procedures: the vector of controls X varies depending
on whether we are estimating model (1) or (2). Equation (4) models the determinants of
founders retaining the CEO title. I is an unobservable variable that measures the aggre-
gation of forces that favor retaining a founder as the CEO. The determinants of I are the
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observable variables Z that one believes should aﬀect the likelihood that a founder keeps
the CEO title plus an unobserved error u2. Equation (5) is the function that models the
decision to keep a founder as the CEO: founders retain the CEO title if and only if I is
above an (unobservable to the econometrician) threshold level I∗.
The model above is one example of an endogenous dummy variable model (Heckman,
1978). Notice that the correlation between the errors of the two equations allows many
interpretations. For example, if unusually good performance implies that the founder is
more likely to retain the CEO title, we should expect ρ to be positive. We should also expect
ρ to be positive if there is an omitted variable that aﬀects performance and founderCEO
in the same direction. However, the results from the previous section suggest that, once
one factors out the direct eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance, the remaining correlation
between firm performance and the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title is negative.
This suggests that ρ is negative.
We can estimate the above system of equations by maximum likelihood to get estimates
of all relevant parameters.15 We use dead founders and number of founders as our main
determinants of I in the second equation. The first equation replicates the models (1) or
(2).
Table 5 reports the results for both models and both performance measures. As before,
the direct eﬀect of founderCEO on performance is always positive and significant at all
conventional significance levels. It is also true that all estimated coeﬃcients are larger than
their OLS counterparts, which is consistent with the results from the previous subsection.
However, the magnitudes of these eﬀects are no longer so large: for example, the estimates
from column II suggest that a firm with average Q will experience a drop of 0.78 units
in its Q when its CEO is not one of its founders. This eﬀect is about twice as large as
the one estimated by OLS but much lower than our 2SLS estimate. We conclude that
the magnitudes of our 2SLS estimates are not robust to changes in model specification.
However, the evidence that there is a direct positive eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance
remains overwhelming.
At the bottom of Table 5 we report our estimates of the correlation between the errors of
the two equations, ρ. Consistent with the hypothesis that good performance might reduce
the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title, we find that ρ is always negative in
15This model is identical to the standard average treatment eﬀects model encountered in the program
evaluation literature (see Maddala, 1983, for many examples).
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all four columns. The estimated correlation between the errors of the two equations also
appears quite sizeable: it is approximately −0.4 in the Q models. Wald tests of the null
that this correlation is zero yield p-values lower than 5% in all four cases, and lower than
1% in three of the four cases. Since testing the null that the correlation coeﬃcient ρ is zero
is an explicit test of the exogeneity of founder-CEO status (under the assumption that the
model is otherwise correctly specified), we reject the null that the two equations in (3) and
(4) are independent in all of our specifications.16
We summarize the results in this section as follows. We confirm the previous findings
that firms that keep one of their founders as their CEOs perform better than the ones that
do not, but the extremely large estimated partial eﬀects of founder-CEOs on performance
that we found in the previous subsection appear to be a feature of our 2SLS specification.
Most importantly, we again find strong evidence that founder-CEO status is not indepen-
dent of performance, and that once one factors out the direct eﬀect of founder-CEOs on
performance, the remaining correlation between firm performance and the likelihood that a
founder retains the CEO title is negative. This is consistent with diﬀerent interpretations
and we discuss the reasonableness of some of these interpretations in more detail in the next
section.
6 Better Performance Leads to Fewer Founder-CEOs: Addi-
tional Evidence and Possible Explanations
The finding that firms with relatively good performances are less likely to be run by founder-
CEOs is somewhat surprising, both because the idea that good performance might make
founder-CEOs less likely to relinquish their titles has some intuitive appeal and because of
our evidence of a causal positive eﬀect of founder-CEOs on performance. Thus, the purpose
of this section is to uncover some additional empirical relationships that might help us
better understand this finding. We first advance some possible explanations for this result
and then we discuss which ones are consistent with our data.
Bad Governance
There is a large amount of evidence showing that poor performance increases the like-
lihood of CEO turnover (e.g., Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988; see also
Goldman, Hazarika and Shivdasani, 2003, for a comprehensive list of papers documenting
16 If we construct our proxy for ROA using EBITDA instead of net income, we always reject the null of
independence of equations at the 1% significance level.
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this relationship). However, in firms with entrenched CEOs this link between poor per-
formance and turnover should be weak. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) provide some
evidence of entrenchment of founder-executives. In a sample of Fortune 500 firms, they find
that firms whose top management teams contain members of the founding-family are less
likely to experience a complete turnover of top executives and are less likely to be targets
of hostile takeovers than other firms. However, this type of entrenchment is not suﬃcient
to explain our findings, because it only suggests that poor performance might have a small
positive or no eﬀect on the likelihood of a founder-CEO being replaced. In fact, we need a
stronger notion of bad governance to explain our findings: poor performance should decrease
the likelihood of founder-CEO turnover. This could happen if bad governance also has a
direct negative eﬀect on performance. In this case, the negative correlation between the
errors of equations (3) and (4) could be due to an omitted variable measuring the overall
quality of governance: firms with bad governance are more likely to perform badly and to
have a founder who is entrenched. Thus, the bad governance hypothesis suggests that poor
performance and the likelihood of replacing a founder-CEO should be negatively related.
According to this hypothesis, however, there is no reason for the CEO to leave the firm
after good performance.
Controlled Succession
Suppose that, after good performance, CEOs are more likely to be able to choose their
successors (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In fact, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989)
claim that ordinary CEO successions are more likely to occur after periods of abnormally
good performance. Founders in particular may value the ability to control succession, for it
allows them to transfer control to their heirs. Thus, the controlled succession hypothesis pre-
dicts that founder-CEOs will step out after some period of consistently good performance,
while it has no prediction for how founder-CEO turnover is aﬀected by bad performance.
Founder Benevolence and the Paradox of Entrepreneurial Success
Suppose that founders believe they have superior managerial capabilities (whether this is
actually true is not important for the argument). Suppose also that founders are benevolent,
i.e. they care more about the future of the company than a CEO who is not one of the
original founders. Founders may therefore want to leave their companies only when they
are in good shape. For example, Wasserman (2003) argues that a founder-CEO’s success
in achieving critical milestones, such as a successful completion of product development,
makes it more likely that he will step down. He calls this phenomenon “the paradox of
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entrepreneurial success.”
Wealth Eﬀects
Founder-CEOs who have much of their wealth invested in the firm benefit greatly from
good firm performance. If they want to retire when rich, they should be more willing
to retire early following good performance. Thus there should be a positive relationship
between past good performance and the likelihood of subsequent founder-CEO departures.
A related but somewhat darker story is that founder-CEOs might be better informed than
other shareholders and may choose to leave the firm and sell their shares when performance
is unusually high. Thus, founder-CEOs may leave their firms to “cash in” before the market
valuation of their shares deteriorates. In both cases “wealth eﬀects” are important, i.e.
founder-CEOs want to leave their firms exactly when their firm-related wealth is high.
In order to explore the empirical relevance of these hypotheses,17 we assess how well
past performances, both good and bad, help predict future changes in command in which
a founder-CEO steps out. Thus we use the timing of events as an identification strategy.
There are two main limitations of this procedure. First, predictive power does not imply
causation, especially when variables reflect the behavior of forward-looking agents. Thus,
we expect market measures of performance to be more plagued by endogeneity problems in
predictive regressions than accounting measures, because the latter tend to be less influenced
by the expectation of future events. Second, and perhaps most importantly, our tests in the
previous sections detected a negative contemporaneous eﬀect of performance on founder-
CEO status. To the extent that performance exhibits some persistence, our approach in this
section should be able to shed some light on the causes of this eﬀect. However, one cannot
fully capture this eﬀect without accounting for its strictly contemporaneous component, for
which identification by means of timing is not feasible.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. When a CEO who is not a founder is replaced,
this typically (though not necessarily) implies that the new CEO is also a non-founder.
17An additional hypothesis that could be consistent with our finding is what might be called a “CEO
Manipulation of Earnings and Short-Horizon” problem. When CEOs are approaching the date when they
expect to depart from a firm, a horizon problem arises. Because they will not be around to collect the
benefits of long-term investments, they might have an incentive to cut expenses prior to expected departures
in order to boost earnings, which might be positively linked to CEO pay. This eﬀect would cause accounting
measures of performance to be artificially high right before CEO turnover. We do not explicitly analyze
this hypothesis here, because previous evidence on this topic leads us to believe that it is unlikely that this
eﬀect is driving our results. For example, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) find little evidence supporting the
short-horizon problem. In fact, they find that while there might be some evidence that managers take actions
that increase accounting earnings prior to CEO departures, these cases are restricted to poorly performing
firms, implying that this eﬀect is more likely to be associated with poor governance in general.
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Therefore, turnover data in firms which are not initially run by founders are not useful for
our purposes. Accordingly, we restrict our sample to firms that were run by one of their
founders in any year in our sample. We then generate an indicator variable called stepout
that takes the value of 1 in the firm-years in which a founder-CEO steps out and 0 otherwise.
For each firm that has experienced a change of command in this restricted sample, we leave
out all observations in the years after the one in which the founder has relinquished the CEO
title. This sample selection procedure severely reduces the number of usable observations.
We therefore expanded our sample to increase the number of changes in command for
founder-CEOs. To do this we used Forbes executive compensation surveys (Forbes, 1992-
1999), which identify whether or not the CEOs of the Forbes 800 are founders. We first
matched ExecuComp to the Forbes 800 firms to identify further instances of firms whose
founders were CEOs. We then tracked these additional firms in the Forbes compensation
surveys until 2001 to identify when the founder no longer held the CEO title. By this
procedure we were able to expand our sample of founder-CEO departures from 23 to 50.
We also identified 535 firm-years in which stepout is equal to zero. We obtain performance
measures and other controls, such as total assets, volatility, CEO ownership, and CEO
tenure, from ExecuComp for the additional firm-years.
The theories we have outlined have predictions for how founder-CEO departures should
be diﬀerentially aﬀected by either good or bad past performance. Thus, in principle the
relationship between performance and the likelihood of founder-CEO departures is poten-
tially non-monotonic. In order to jointly test some of these hypotheses, we have to impose
some empirical specifications that allow for the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship
between the dependent and independent variables.
A simple and intuitive procedure that is well suited for our purposes is as follows. We
create a dummy variable called highQ that equals 1 for very high values of lagged Q and
is zero otherwise. We consider Q to be high if it is in the top quartile of the full sample
Q distribution for that given year. Similarly, we create a dummy variable called lowQ that
equals 1 whenever Q is in the bottom quartile of the full sample Q distribution for that
given year, and is zero otherwise. The variables highROA and lowROA are defined in an
analogous way. Because we want to see the eﬀects of persistent past performance on CEO
turnover, we use the averages of one- and two-year lagged Q and ROA to construct our
measures of extreme performance.18 Theses variables partially capture the relative nature
18We chose two years because using three or more years would severely restrict our sample size.
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of performance, that is, how the firm is performing in relation to others.19
Table 6 presents the results of Probits estimating the likelihood of a founder-CEO
stepping out as a function of highQ and lowQ and year dummies, and also as a function
of highROA and lowROA and year dummies. As one can see from column I, we find that
the estimated coeﬃcients on highQ and lowQ are both positive but not significant. From
column II, however, we find that both highROA and lowROA help predict future changes
in which a founder-CEO steps out.
The lack of predictive power of Q is not surprising. It is a well established fact in the
CEO turnover literature that accounting measures of performance are better predictors of
turnover than market measures (Weisbach, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). In fact,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) claim that this is exactly what theory predicts: accounting
measures of performance reflect the characteristics of current managers, while stock market
based measures of performance should also reflect the expectation of future management
changes.
The finding that past poor performance as measured by ROA increases the likelihood
that a founder-CEO will leave the firm is at odds with the bad governance hypothesis. This
result is not surprising, given the well-documented evidence on the disciplining role of CEO
dismissals (Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). What our evidence adds to
this literature is the confirmation that founders are not immune to this disciplining device.
On the other hand, the finding that past good performance as measured by ROA in-
creases the likelihood that a founder-CEO will leave the firm in the near future is consistent
with the other three hypotheses: controlled succession, founder benevolence and wealth
eﬀects.
Before we try to further discriminate among these hypotheses, we briefly consider some
robustness checks. First, our choice of cutoﬀ (25%) to define both high and low performance
is not important. Choosing any cutoﬀ in the range of 10% to 35% always leads to estimated
parameters that are significant at least at the 10% level in the ROA specification. As
expected, as the cutoﬀ approaches 50% the eﬀects become much weaker and eventually
not significant. For cutoﬀs lower than 10%, the standard errors tend to go up, which is
consistent with the intuition that the precision of our estimates should decrease as the
19Changing the comparison group appears to have only minimal eﬀects on these variables. For example,
in earlier versions of this paper we have used the full sample (1992-1999) as the comparison group, and the
results were almost exactly identical.
18
number of firms that are considered to be performing extremely well or extremely badly
decreases.
We also experimented with including other controls in our specifications (not reported
in the tables). Firm-level controls do not have significant eﬀects on the probability of a
founder-CEO departure. For example, firm size (proxied by the log of total assets) and
volatility have no significant eﬀect on founder-CEO departures. Their inclusion also does
not change the significance of the results reported in Table 6. On the other hand, CEO
tenure and CEO age do have significant eﬀects on founder-CEO departures, but again they
have minimal impact on the estimated eﬀects of both bad and good performance on CEO
departures.
As a final robustness check, we also tried a more flexible specification that is capable of
capturing richer non-monotonic relationships between performance and the probability of
CEO departures. For each performance measure, we created two new variables: we interact
both the high and the low performance dummies with the average of one- and two-year
lagged performance. We estimate Probits using both the dummies and the interaction terms.
This specification allows us to capture the additional eﬀect that, for example, performance
has on founder-CEO departures conditional on performance being high. It also allow us to
better explore the continuous nature of the underlying performance variables. We report
the results of these extended specifications in columns III and IV of Table 6. We see
that the significance of the eﬀects of both the low and high performance dummies is not
aﬀected by the inclusion of the interaction terms. Furthermore, these interaction terms
appear to have no additional predictive power. This suggests that our original simpler
specification is capturing most of the eﬀects of performance on the likelihood of founder-
CEO departures, consistent with previous evidence that the performance-CEO turnover
relationship is characterized by threshold eﬀects (e.g. Goldman, Hazarika and Shivdasani,
2003).
To further discriminate among our hypotheses, we examine the importance of wealth
eﬀects in Table 7.20 If wealth eﬀects are important determinants of founder-CEO departures,
one should expect that founder-CEOs with more firm-related wealth leave more often. In
column I, we see that the opposite holds: founder-CEOs with higher ownership stakes are
less likely to leave the firm. Of course, ownership may aﬀect the likelihood of departure
20We only report results using ROA. As before, the regressions using Q suggest similar results, but they
are never significant.
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for reasons that are not related to CEO wealth. For example, CEOs with more ownership
might be more entrenched and thus less likely to be forced to leave. Strictly speaking,
wealth eﬀects should play a role only when CEOs are departing after good performance. To
test this hypothesis more directly, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
founder-CEO ownership is “high” and 0 otherwise. We define high ownership as an above-
average equity stake (the average ownership of founder-CEOs in our sample is approximately
5%). We then interact the high ownership dummy with both highROA and lowROA. If
founder-CEOs are departing after periods of good performance due to wealth eﬀects, then
we should expect that the sensitivity of departure to good performance should be higher
when they have more ownership. Thus, we expect the interaction between highROA and
highOWNERSHIP to have a positive eﬀect on the probability of CEO departure. From
column II, we see that this interaction term actually enters with a negative sign and is
not significantly diﬀerent from zero. Overall, we find no support for the hypothesis that
wealth eﬀects are responsible for the positive correlation between high performance and
founder-CEO departures in our sample.
Our conclusions are as follows. The finding that firms with relatively good performances
are less likely to be run by founder-CEOs appear to be due more to founders choosing to
relinquish control after periods of good performance than to an omitted variable correlated
with bad governance. In addition, our evidence suggests that wealth-eﬀects are not driving
our results. This implies that the hypotheses most consistent with our evidence are the
controlled-succession and the founder-benevolence hypotheses.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide strong evidence that founder-CEO status is influenced by firm per-
formance. Using methods based on instrumental variables, we find that firm performance
has a negative eﬀect on the likelihood that a firm is run by one of its founders. This result
is not sensitive to model specification, to alternative measures of performance, or to econo-
metric procedures. After factoring out the negative eﬀect of performance on founder-CEO
status, we obtain a positive causal eﬀect of founder-CEOs on firm performance, an eﬀect
that is quantitatively larger than the eﬀect estimated through standard OLS regressions.
In order to further understand this negative eﬀect of performance on founder-CEO sta-
tus, we estimate the probability of founder-CEO departures as a (potentially non-monotonic)
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function of past performance. Our main finding is that past superior accounting perfor-
mance increases the likelihood that founder-CEOs will step out. Our evidence is not con-
sistent with the hypothesis that an omitted variable correlated with bad governance can
explain the negative relationship between firm performance and founder-CEO status nor
with the hypothesis that founder-CEOs leave once they are wealthy enough. This leaves us
with two potential arguments that might explain our new finding: (1) founder-CEOs may
value control over their succession more than non-founders, and (2) founder-CEOs may
want to leave their companies “in good shape.”
Our paper has implications for the growing literature on family firms. The positive
eﬀect of founders on performance suggests that the higher performance of family firms
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003) could be driven primarily by firms where the current CEO is a
founder. Thus, there might be significant distinctions between founder control and family
control. In addition, the finding that firms with relatively good performances are less likely
to be run by founder-CEOs may help explain the negative correlation between inherited
control and performance (e.g. Pérez-González, 2002). If performance is mean reverting
and founders leave at its peak, one should observe a decline in performance when founders
transfer control to their heirs even when inherited control is not bad for performance. This
interpretation is most likely to be true if founders value the ability to transfer control to
their heirs, because in this case high performance might make it easier for founders to
control succession. Our results suggest that studying the diﬀerences between founder-CEO
succession and the succession of professional CEOs should provide interesting topics for
future research.
8 Appendix - Construction of Instruments
In this section, we discuss the construction of the instruments for the dummy variable
founderCEO indicating whether or not the CEO is also one of the company’s founders. As
we discussed in section 5, we use two instruments for this dummy. The first is the proportion
of a company’s founders who are dead prior to the time our data starts (1992). The second
is the number of founders of the company.
We collected the data necessary to construct the instruments from a variety of sources
using Lexis-Nexis as well as the International Directory of Company Histories (various
volumes) and company histories on company websites when available. In order to determine
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who the founders of the firms in our sample are, we first had to establish what the founding
event of the firm in its form in which it appears in 1998 was (since our firms are taken from
the 1998 Fortune 500 list). We consider the following four types of events to be founding
events: a simple business start-up (e.g. a shop opening), a merger of equals, a spin-oﬀ of a
division that was not previously a separate company that had been acquired and a major
change in ownership, e.g. an LBO, MBO or other acquisition, that leads to a major change
in the development of the company. In the case of a merger of equals, we consider the
founders of the new company to be the founders of both firms that are merging. In the
case of a spin-oﬀ we consider the founders to be the founders of the original company, as
well as the CEO at the time of the spin-oﬀ if he appears important to the development of
the company. If a company was acquired and spun-oﬀ again, we consider the founders to
be the founders of the company pre spin-oﬀ. We also generally consider any person to be
a founder of the company who is identified as such in any of our data sources. In some
cases our sources also identify important investors in the company or the first CEO who
was hired by a founder as founders.
Our procedure was to use the company descriptions in the International Directory of
Company Histories and the histories of the companies in Hoover’s Company Profile Data-
base, as well as information on the founders of the 1992 Fortune 200 firms in the National
Commission on Entrepreneurship’s (2001) study on entrepreneurs as a starting point for
identifying the founding event, and if possible, the names of the founders. This procedure
worked better for firms that were founded recently than for older firms that had undergone
several mergers or restructurings. Generally older firms tended to have company histo-
ries on their websites that we could use to identify what the firm considers to be its main
founding event. Once we identified the founding events, we searched archived stories from
the sources Forbes, Fortune and U.S. News on Lexis-Nexis for further information on the
founders of the company and information on whether or not the founders died prior to 1992
and the year the founders died. We consider a founder to be alive after 1992 when we could
either verify that he was alive after 1992 or we could not find an obituary for the founder
and the founder is mentioned in news articles as playing an important role in the company
after 1975. If we are unable to find the name of a founder, we consider him to be alive if
most of the other founders are alive. Otherwise, we consider a founder to be dead. When we
were unable to find the necessary information on Lexis-Nexis, we searched for the founders
using Forbes’ Peopletracker and the internet.
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Our final data set consists of 580 observations on founders for 321 firms in our sample.
Our instruments are a straightforward per-firm average of the dummy indicating whether
the founder died prior to 1992 and the per-firm sum of all founders.
To reduce data collection costs, we did not collect data on founders for a random sample
of 63 firms that had been incorporated more than 64 years prior to 1992 out of these 321
firms. For these firms we assume that there was only one founder and that the founder
died prior to 1992. Since it is highly likely that the founders of these firms all died prior
to 1992 and the probability that any of the founders are the CEO in 1994 is very low, we
do not expect this shortcut to aﬀect our results. Similarly, when the parties involved in a
merger of equals themselves were the product of mergers of equals, we consider the firm to
have two founders who died prior to 1992. Since these firms were all older firms and the
influence of the original founders of each component firm is likely to be very small after
several restructurings, this coding is consistent with the fact that it is highly unlikely that
any of the founders is the CEO in 1994.
Of the 258 firms for which we collected detailed founder data, most were founded by
simple business start-ups. Approximately 21 firms were founded through mergers of equals
and 13 were founded as the result of a spin-oﬀ. The average number of founders in our
sample is 1.8 with a standard deviation of 1.1 and a maximum of 8 founders. 50% of the
firms were founded prior to 1961. This is reflected in the fact that the average proportion
of founders who died prior to 1992 is 70.3% with a standard deviation of 43.5%.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Sample consists of 321 publicly traded, non-regulated Þrms from the 1998 Fortune 500
that were available on ExecuComp (2000) during the years 1992-1999. Most Þnancial
and CEO data are from ExecuComp (2000). Firm age is collected from Moodys
Manuals (1999), proxy statements and 10-Ks for Þscal 1998. Founder data are from
a variety of sources consisting of proxy statements, annual reports and the internet.
Our proxy for Tobins Q is = (book value of assets-book value of equity + market
value of equity)/book value of assets. ROA = net income before extraordinary items
and discontinued operations/book value of assets. FounderCEO is equal to one if
the CEO is a founder of the company. CEO ownership is deÞned as the ratio of
the number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for stock splits to total
shares outstanding. CEO tenure is the number of years since the CEO was appointed
CEO. CEO equity-based pay is the value of annual option pay divided by the sum
of salary, bonus and annual option pay. V olatility is the Black-Scholes volatility as
reported in ExecuComp. Firm age is the number of years since the Þrms Þrst date
of incorporation.
Variable
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. No. Obs.
Q 2.05 1.40 0.83 19.16 2128
logQ 0.59 0.46 −0.18 2.95 2128
ROA 5.68 5.75 −48.19 48.15 2128
FounderCEO 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 2128
CEO ownership 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.44 2128
CEO tenure 7.36 7.24 0.00 47.00 2128
CEO equity-based pay 0.47 0.29 0.00 1.00 2128
Volatility 0.29 0.11 0.12 1.05 2128
Firm assets (log) 8.72 1.07 5.78 12.91 2128
Firm age (log) 3.82 0.89 0.00 4.98 2128
Table 2: OLS Regressions of Firm Performance on Founder-CEO Status
This table reports results of regressing Þrm performance (measured alternatively by
logQ and ROA) on founder-CEO status. Columns I and II report results using logQ
as the performance measure. Columns III and IV report results using ROA. For each
performance measure, we estimate the empirical model in equations (1) and (2) in the
text using OLS. All data is described in Table 1. The estimation period is 1992-1999.
All regressions include year eﬀects and 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The estimations
correct the error structure for heteroskedasdicity and within-Þrm correlation using the
Huber-White estimator. t-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable
logQ ROA
Indep. Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
FounderCEO 0.242*** 0.185*** 2.770*** 1.751*
(3.31) (2.58) (2.91) (1.91)
ln(assets) −0.025 −0.026 −0.519** −0.470**
(−1.12) (−1.18) (−2.19) (−2.03)
ln(age) −0.037 −0.038 −0.471 −0.479*
(−1.29) (−1.33) (−1.59) (−1.66)
V olatility −0.858*** −0.932*** −16.217*** −16.988***
(−4.62) (−5.13) (−6.96) (−7.50)
CEO ownership . 1.327*** . 20.085***
(2.81) (3.24)
CEO tenure . −0.002 . −0.012
(−0.68) (−0.45)
CEO equity pay . 0.159*** . 0.955
(3.01) (1.570)
Observations 2128 2128 2128 2128
Adj-R2 0.30 0.32 0.19 0.20
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 3: 2SLS Regressions of Firm Performance on Founder-CEO Status:
First Stage
This table reports the Þrst-stage of the two-stage least squares regressions relating
Þrm performance to founder-CEO status for both models (1) and (2) in the text.
We instrument founderCEO using dead founders and number of founders. Dead
founders is the average of an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a given
founder is dead as of 1992 and zero otherwise. Number of founders is the total
number of founders for each Þrm. Details on the construction of the instruments are
provided in the Appendix. All other data is described in Table 1. The estimation
period is 1992-1999. All regressions include year eﬀects and 2-digit SIC industry
dummies. t-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable:
FounderCEO
Indep. Variables (I) (II)
Dead founders −0.293*** −0.190***
(−17.16) (−11.94)
Number of founders 0.022*** 0.022***
(4.10) (4.66)
ln(assets) −0.007 0.006
(−1.11) (1.09)
ln(age) −0.500*** −0.061***
(−6.36) (−8.62)
V olatility 0.183*** 0.249***
(2.83) (4.23)
CEO ownership . 1.299***
(10.39)
CEO tenure . 0.012***
(15.53)
CEO equity pay . 0.030*
(1.69)
Observations 2128 2128
Adj-R2 0.40 0.52
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 4: 2SLS Regressions of Firm Performance on Founder-CEO Status:
Second Stage
This table reports results of regressing Þrm performance (measured alternatively by
logQ and ROA) on FounderCEO status. FounderCEO is instrumented with dead
founders and number of founders. The Þrst stage regressions are reported in Table
3. Columns I and II report results using logQ as the performance measure. Columns
III and IV report results using ROA. For each performance measure, we estimate the
empirical model in equations (1) and (2) in the text. All data is described in Table 1
and the Appendix. The estimation period is 1992-1999. All regressions include year
eﬀects and 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The estimations correct the error structure
for heteroskedasdicity and within-Þrm correlation using the Huber-White estimator.
The bottom row of this Table reports an estimate of the diﬀerence between the IV
and the OLS coeﬃcients on the founderCEO variable, computed using a Hausman
(1978) speciÞcation test. t-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable
logQ ROA
Indep. Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
FounderCEO 1.096*** 1.485*** 8.998*** 10.843***
(4.33) (3.63) (3.81) (2.95)
ln(assets) −0.100 −0.028 −0.410* −0.490**
(−0.41) (−1.08) (−1.73) (−1.96)
ln(age) 0.052 0.087** 0.177 0.396
(1.52) (2.05) (0.53) (1.01)
V olatility −1.196*** −1.443*** −18.687*** −20.558***
(−4.53) (−4.44) (−6.86) (−6.70)
CEO ownership . −0.547 . 6.981
(−0.56) (0.77)
CEO tenure . −0.020*** . −0.141**
(−3.21) (−2.39)
CEO equity pay . 0.100 . 0.543
(1.52) (0.78)
Observations 2128 2128 2128 2128
Diﬀ. IV - OLS 0.854*** 1.300*** 6.230*** 9.093***
(8.883) (7.948) (5.345) (4.861)
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 5: Firm Performance and Founder-CEO Status: Results From Endoge-
nous Dummy Variable Model
This table reports results of regressing Þrm performance (measured alternatively by
logQ and ROA) on founder-CEO status. FounderCEO is instrumented with dead
founders and number of founders. The estimation method takes the discrete nature
of founderCEO explicitly into account. Columns I and II report results using logQ
as the performance measure. Columns III and IV report results using ROA. For each
performance measure, we estimate the empirical model in equations (3) to (5) in the
text. We use the same control variables as in Tables 2 to 4. All data are described
in Table 1 and the Appendix. The estimation period is 1992-1999. All regressions
include year eﬀects and 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The estimations correct the
error structure for heteroskedasdicity and within-Þrm correlation using the Huber-
White estimator. The bottom row reports an estimate of the correlation between the
error terms of equations (3) and (4) in the text. The P-value is from a Wald test of
the independence of equations. t-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable
logQ ROA
Indep. Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
FounderCEO 0.436*** 0.383*** 3.579*** 2.514***
(5.42) (4.53) (3.76) (2.78)
ln(assets) −0.022 −0.023 −0.507** −0.460**
(−1.01) (−1.08) (−2.17) (−2.02)
ln(age) −0.028 −0.028 −0.430 −0.439
(−1.03) (−1.04) (−1.50) (−1.57)
V olatility −0.936*** −1.012*** −16.521*** −17.265***
(−5.19) (−5.73) (−7.28) (−7.83)
CEO ownership . 1.293*** . 19.907***
(2.84) (3.27)
CEO tenure . −0.002 . −0.013
(−0.83) (−0.50)
CEO equity pay . 0.150*** . 0.919
(2.89) (1.54)
Observations 2128 2128 2128 2128
Correlation estimate −0.395*** −0.397*** −0.121*** −0.112**
P-value ind. eqs. 0.0002 0.0003 0.0052 0.0123
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 6: Probit Estimates of Founder-CEO Succession
In this table we examine the eﬀect of lagged performance on the likelihood that a
founder retains the CEO title. We restrict our sample to Þrms that were run by one
of their founders in any year in our sample. The dependent variable (Stepout) is a
dummy which takes the value of 1 in the Þrm-years in which a founder-CEO steps out
and is 0 otherwise. For each Þrm that has experienced a change of command in this
restricted sample, we leave out all observations in the years after the one in which the
founder has relinquished the CEO title. Columns I and III report results using logQ
as the performance measure, and Columns II and IV report results using ROA. The
variable highQ is a dummy which is equal to one if the average of the Þrst two lags of
Q is at the top quartile of the Q distribution in any Þrm-year, and is zero otherwise.
The variable lowQ is a dummy which is equal to one if the average of the Þrst two
lags of Q is at the bottom quartile of the Q distribution in any Þrm-year, and is zero
otherwise. The variables highROA and lowROA are constructed in the same way.
LaggedQ and laggedROA are the averages of the Þrst two lags of each performance
variable. All data are described in Table 1. The estimation period is 1992-1999.
All regressions include year eﬀects. The estimations correct the error structure for
heteroskedasdicity using the Huber-White estimator. z-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable: Stepout
Indep. Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
HighQ 0.117 . 0.594 .
(0.67) (1.48)
LowQ 0.311 . 0.426 .
(1.22) (1.56)
HighROA . 0.472* . 0.862**
(2.48) (2.32)
LowROA . 0.723*** . 0.719***
(3.38) (3.21)
LaggedQ ∗HighQ . . −0.180 .
(−1.32)
LaggedQ ∗ LowQ . . −1.892 .
(-1.13)
LaggedROA ∗HighROA . . . −0.014
(−1.19)
LaggedROA ∗ LowROA . . . −0.002
(−0.21)
Observations 459 466 459 466
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 7: Probit Estimates of Founder-CEO Succession with Ownership Con-
trols
In this table we examine the eﬀect of ownership controls on the likelihood that a
founder retains the CEO title. We add lagged ownership and two interaction terms
between ownership and performance to the speciÞcation in column II of Table 6. We
deÞne an indicator variable called highOWNERSHIP which takes the value of 1 if
lagged ownership is above 0.05. The estimation period is 1992-1999. All regressions
include year eﬀects. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasdicity
using the Huber-White estimator. z-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable:
Stepout
Indep. Variables (I) (II)
HighROA 0.514*** 0.562***
(2.62) (2.59)
LowROA 0.663*** 0.554**
(3.02) (2.19)
Lagged Ownership −2.308* −2.243
(−1.89) (−1.34)
HighOWNERSHIP ∗ highROA . −0.151
(−0.44)
HighOWNERSHIP ∗ lowROA . 0.356
(0.94)
Observations 461 461
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
